China provided USD 23.9 billion in grants and loan commitments for 168 ports across 90 countries between 2000–2025, according to a new report, underscoring Beijing’s strategic drive to secure global maritime supply chains and mitigate blockages in future conflicts.
The 133-page report released on March 5 by the AidData research lab at William & Mary, a public university in Virginia, comes just as concerns grow about Iran’s attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz—a crucial shipping lane for energy—after the country came under attack by the US and Israel.
Over the two-decade period, Chinese state-owned creditors and donors financed more than 363 seaport projects in developed and developing economies, the researchers found. These involved the construction, expansion and modernization of port facilities and, in some cases, included security scanners or cranes supplied by Chinese entities.
China also “increasingly” co-located its port investments near Chinese-financed mines, considered part of an effort to ensure supplies of critical minerals deemed vital to national security. Naval activity was detected in more than half of Chinese-financed port facilities, the report says. The authors did not rule out Beijing’s intention to convert or use existing ports as major naval bases in the future, despite a lack of evidence that it is prioritizing the militarization of ports.
The team of researchers led by Alexander Wooley said they found no evidence to support the “debt trap” narrative often associated with Chinese overseas lending. “Instead, China is investing in ports that can receive its vast exports and facilitate the movement of essential commodities, such as soybeans, critical minerals, liquid natural gas, oil, and more,” they wrote, arguing that the ports are designed to promote Chinese commercial interests overseas and maximize profits for its lenders.
While 54% of the financial support benefited low- and middle-income countries, the remainder went to 20 developed economies, from the Americas to Oceania, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Australia emerged as the single largest recipient of Chinese seaport financing, receiving USD 4.5 billion for seven ports located in Brisbane, Newcastle, Melbourne, and Gladstone.
Such lending has generally supported China’s efforts to secure raw materials, particularly coal and iron, according to the report. The projects have largely avoided controversy, except for the 99-year lease to Darwin Port that Shandong Landbridge, a private Chinese company, secured in 2015.
Describing the port as being in the “national interest,” Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in January reiterated a vow to take control of the facility, despite reaffirming bilateral ties with China during a visit to Beijing in July 2025.
AidData found that five ports in Israel, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman received USD 2.6 billion in Chinese financing, as Beijing seeks to protect its oil and gas procurement in the region. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East has brightened the spotlight on China’s role as the top buyer of Iranian oil.
“The Middle East is one of the few areas where [China] has taken tangible, public steps to establish long-term naval presence,” the report says, referring to the first Chinese overseas naval base in Djibouti. The report also highlights controversy over Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi, about which US intelligence raised suspicions in 2021 that China was working on a “secret military installation” within the terminal. This prompted a flurry of diplomacy between Washington and the UAE, which denied ever considering hosting the Chinese military.
“The alleged attempt to build a military facility at Khalifa is consistent with the notion that Beijing has an interest in expanding its naval presence in the Middle East beyond its base in Djibouti,” providing strategic depth for its foreign policy agenda, the report states. It also cautions that this brings risk, exposing China to regional disputes and crises and “potentially forcing it into unwanted entanglements,” a pitfall made apparent by the current conflict and Iran’s retaliation against the UAE and other Gulf states.
The report also identifies USD 4.7 billion in Chinese-financed port equipment. Partially state-backed Nuctech supplied scanners for containers and trucks, while state-owned Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries provided container-handling cranes. The report cites earlier studies that raised concerns that such equipment could give Chinese authorities access to sensitive data, ranging from biomedical information to military transshipments.
The deepwater port in Chancay, Peru, is another China-financed and majority-owned facility highlighted in the study. Beijing aims to link it by railway to the opposite coast of South America in Ilheus, Brazil. President Xi Jinping, who personally inaugurated the port in 2024 during a visit to Peru, described it as a project to “forge a new maritime-land corridor” between China and Latin America.
Last month, the US government warned that Peru could lose control of Chancay after a local court limited the regulator’s oversight of the facility.
Despite its expansive coverage, AidData did not document the China-linked ports in Panama that have been a focus of a geopolitical tussle between the superpowers. Their financing predated 2000, putting them beyond the scope of the research, Wooley told Nikkei Asia. Panamanian authorities in January revoked Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison’s concession rights to the two ports, located at both ends of the Panama Canal.
During the study period, nearly one-third of Chinese-financed port projects hosted at least one instance of Chinese military activity, including naval port calls and visits by the Silk Road Ark hospital ship.
“China’s global maritime supply chains, anchored by its overseas port network, provide a geopolitical benefit, a parallel logistic network that offers strategic independence free from interference from Western institutions,” the report said. “That permits it to contemplate a military counter to possible island chain containment strategies or constricting blockages attempted by an enemy in any future conflict.”
This article first appeared on Nikkei Asia. It has been republished here as part of 36Kr’s ongoing partnership with Nikkei.