In 2025, Chinese dessert soups, an old category, suddenly became popular.
Among the segment’s representative companies are, arguably, the Mak Kee Milk Company and Chiu Gee. Over the past year, their store counts increased by roughly 1,000 and 300, respectively. Mak Kee’s expansion has been especially striking. At the start of 2025, it had only 53 stores. One year later, it had become the largest Chinese dessert soup chain, under the Makkee Dessert brand.
On the other side are older players that have seen little growth for a long time. As of today, Honeymoon Dessert, founded in 1995, has about 200 stores. Meet Fresh entered mainland China in 2009 and currently has more than 500 stores. Over the past several decades, they have seen little major change or innovation.
What happened to the Chinese dessert soup category? And what opportunities did companies such as Mak Kee seize?
In 2021, founder Xu Kang opened Mak Kee’s first store in Huzhou, Zhejiang. By using milk as the base, the brand sought to soften the flavor profile of traditional Chinese dessert soups, which tend to have stronger regional characteristics. At the end of 2024, the brand caught Xie Yongliang’s attention. At the time, Mak Kee’s founding team was still working out of a shared office in Nanxun, Huzhou, with only a small team.
Before Mak Kee, Xie had been a large-scale franchise operator and had invested in many restaurant brands. He said he had long been looking for brands with product differentiation that had not yet been widely rolled out in the market. Once his team enters, it fully takes over operations.
Mak Kee was one such case. Xie’s team invested in Mak Kee at the start of 2025, beginning the process of standardizing and scaling the brand. Xie now serves as general manager of the company.
One F&B investor told 36Kr that modern Chinese-style dessert soup brands such as Mak Kee are built around fresh in-store preparation. At Mak Kee, most of its toppings are delivered to stores, then cooked on-site in pressure cookers.
“Most traditional Chinese dessert soup brands used to rely on premade ingredients, which required added sugar for preservation, making the taste overly sweet. By preparing products fresh in-store, Mak Kee can control sweetness more precisely and adapt to the trend toward healthier consumption,” the investor said.
Xie concurred. He told 36Kr that Mak Kee has struck a delicate balance in controlling sugar levels. “If it is too sweet, it reverts to traditional Chinese dessert soup. If it is too light, it is not enjoyable. This really tests the R&D team’s capabilities,” he said.
After identifying the category opportunity, Xie’s team made a series of standardization upgrades at Mak Kee. It streamlined SKUs to just over 20, halted expansion of streetside stores, shifted core locations to malls, readjusted its store unit economics model, and refreshed the store management system. Most importantly, Mak Kee’s new product structure allows it to tap the broader tea beverage supply chain. Because it does not use fresh fruit, it also has a higher gross margin.
This ties back to Xie’s original advantage. Large-scale franchise operators like him lived through the rapid growth of tea brands and are familiar with scaled operating models. In 2025, Mak Kee’s average single-store gross merchandise value (GMV) in peak season exceeded RMB 300,000 (USD 44,256.9) per month. Most operating Mak Kee stores have a payback period of eight to 12 months.
So when friends asked Xie why anyone would still invest in Chinese dessert soups, he told them, “this is not the old Chinese dessert soup.”
Mak Kee offers a new story about remaking Chinese dessert soups. But if the lens is widened to F&B businesses in general, especially the tea beverages, its playbook is not unusual: find a validated category with demand, differentiate the product, reuse the tea beverage supply chain, refine the single-store model, and then use a large-scale franchise operator team to open stores quickly. This is also why new categories and regional tea beverage brands can still find opportunities after leaders have emerged.
Still, Xie remains optimistic about Mak Kee’s market position. He told 36Kr that the company chose to sprint to more than 1,000 stores last year because it knew the window would not stay open for long. “In 2026, Chinese dessert soups will enter a shakeout phase, and there will not be many opportunities left for new brands,” he said.
The horns have already sounded. Meet Fresh is trying to reinvent itself, while new cross-category players are moving in. In April, CFB Group, which owns DQ and Papa John’s in China, announced an investment in Meet Fresh and became its largest controlling shareholder. Meet Fresh will reduce its SKUs from 45 to 25 and shift toward lower sweetness, pure milk, and smaller portions.
Restaurant brands are also entering the field. Chayan Yuese has expanded into desserts through a shop-in-shop format, GoodMe has added a peach gum and tapioca stewed milk dessert to its menu, and Haidilao has opened its first Chinese dessert soup shop in Shanghai.
In an interview with 36Kr, Xie discussed his experience investing in and transforming the brand, his view of the Chinese dessert soup category, and where he thinks Mak Kee will go next.
The following transcript has been edited and consolidated for brevity and clarity.
36Kr: How did you first notice Mak Kee?
Xie Yongliang (XY): I come from a restaurant investment background. I officially invested in this company in early January 2025. At the time, Mak Kee had been established for more than three years and had opened 53 stores. After talking with the founding team, we felt there was an opportunity to upgrade the traditional Chinese dessert soup category, and we also liked Mak Kee’s brand DNA and product structure.
36Kr: What brands have you invested in?
XY: When I was in university, China was in the era of mass entrepreneurship and innovation. I started a business in my first year. The school was also supportive and gave us free office space in an entrepreneurship park for students. At that time, we did some cultural and creative projects.
I made money in my first year, then in my second year I tried opening several physical F&B stores around the school. After graduation, we set up an investment company focused on small restaurants and eateries, and have spent 15 years working deeply in the industry.
At present, our investment business has three main parts: investing in equity in F&B brand companies, investing in brands’ regional subsidiaries, and operating as the large-scale franchise operators many people are familiar with.
Over the years, we have invested in multiple stores for brands including ChaPanda and Chagee, as well as others like Chen Mandi, Newyobo, and Yunshaoque. Take Newyobo as an example. When we invested, the brand had only a dozen stores, was still using a shared office, and had only two employees. In just half a year, we helped Newyobo expand to more than 300 stores. We have handled quite a few cases like this over the past 15 years, usually behind the scenes.
36Kr: When choosing brands, what qualities do you value?
XY: Brand DNA and the profit model. I do not care about the company’s size, nor do I pay much attention to the founder’s background. Before entering, we look at whether the product itself is differentiated, whether it tastes good, and whether it has repeat purchases. Then we investigate whether the product has broad applicability, because that determines its room for growth.
When we came into contact with Mak Kee, we recognized its product system and taste. Its operating model was also fairly healthy. At the time, one store had monthly revenue of RMB 120,000 (USD 17,702.8) and net profit of more than RMB 30,000 (USD 4,425.7). The sales were not high and the location was not particularly good, but the store still maintained healthy profitability.
I once used an analogy: Mak Kee was like a ready-made race car. After we entered, we would not make disruptive changes to the overall frame. The brand name and product structure stayed the same. But we would replace and upgrade the engine, wheels, and tires, and if necessary, the driver as well. The brand may still appear to be the same brand, but its core has been fully upgraded.
Compared with professional investment institutions, we are not well known, but we focus on post-investment management. We look for brands that are clearly differentiated but have not yet been widely rolled out. After investing, we take over operations and management in full. That is our advantage.
36Kr: Focusing on Mak Kee at the time, what did you think had to be redone?
XY: When we invested, Mak Kee’s founding team was still working from a shared office in Nanxun, Huzhou. The space was an entrepreneurship shared office affiliated with a government library. The team had only a few founders and a small number of employees, without clear and complete functional departments.
After taking over, we moved the operations center to Hangzhou, where there is a stronger talent pool, and rebuilt the functional departments.
The company’s strategy at the time also had problems. The founding team lacked mall channel resources, so its early stores were mainly streetside stores. Although the stores were profitable, that model was not good in the long run. In a year, operating conditions for about five months would be affected by the weather. Streetside stores also could not create a unified brand image.
36Kr: What adjustments did you make?
XY: We halted plans to add new streetside stores and shifted our direction to prime mall locations. At the same time, we guided existing older streetside stores to gradually move into malls.
36Kr: In moving from streetside stores to mall stores, what changes did you make to the store unit economics model?
XY: The main thing was raising single-store GMV. Before the transformation, most of Mak Kee’s stores had GMV in the low six-figure RMB range, while a small number reached RMB 200,000–300,000 (USD 29,504.6–44,256.9). Profitability was not a problem, but that was built on the lower rental costs of streetside stores and the fact that early franchisees generally worked in the stores themselves, which lowered labor costs.
Mall stores are different. Rent and property management fees rise sharply. Most of Mak Kee’s stores now are invested in by large-scale franchise operators who do not personally stay in the store. Whether it is labor costs or operating details, we need to raise store GMV to safeguard profits.
Now we set separate operating strategies for offline store visits and online delivery, improving both in-store traffic and delivery order volume. We have also introduced a mature and scientific tea beverage store management system to optimize costs in existing store operations. Mak Kee’s average store GMV in peak season has already exceeded RMB 300,000.
36Kr: Which parts of Mak Kee were worth preserving?
XY: Product R&D capability and product structure. Mak Kee’s founding team is very good at product development. I have spoken with founder Xu Kang many times and really admire his product thinking. We also researched other brands in the same category, and most founders could not produce products at Mak Kee’s level.
Among all the areas we transformed, the product changed the least.
36Kr: Mak Kee’s stores are mostly large. Why? Are you not worried that the payback period will be too long?
XY: At present, 80% of the stores require an investment of RMB 600,000–700,000 (USD 88,513.9–103,266.2), and most stores are 70–120 square meters. The store format for Chinese dessert soups is different from that for milk tea. For milk tea, a 30-square-meter small store and a 300-square-meter large store do not differ much in sales. In some cases, the small store even has higher sales per square meter. People drink milk tea while walking and rarely sit for long.
But Chinese dessert soups are strongly dine-in and space-oriented. Nobody walks around eating from a bowl of dessert soup. It looks too awkward. In particular, our core customers are young women and parent-child groups, who care a lot about dignity, leisure, and emotional value.
For Mak Kee, the larger the store and the more dine-in seats it has, the higher the sales. Even if the location is good, if the store is too small and cannot seat people, sales will not rise. At present, most operating stores have a payback period of 8–12 months.
36Kr: Chinese dessert soups are a legacy category. Why was Mak Kee able to achieve significant growth last year?
XY: F&B businesses are not like technology companies. It is hard to produce disruptive change. What we are doing is more about optimizing and upgrading on the basis of traditional Chinese dessert soups. Mak Kee’s growth does not come from a single breakthrough. It comes from combining more than 100 small optimization points into a complete playbook.
36Kr: When investors analyze Mak Kee, some believe traditional Chinese dessert soup brands rely on premade ingredients, which require added sugar for preservation, so the taste is sweeter. They say Mak Kee’s specialty is controlling sweetness through fresh in-store preparation. How do you view that?
XY: That is indeed one of our advantages, but it is only one dimension. Our brand focuses on freshly made Chinese dessert soups that are naturally sweet. The toppings are mostly delivered to stores and then cooked on-site in pressure cookers. The texture and taste of freshly prepared ingredients are much better than canned premade ingredients. Sensitive consumers can detect that subtle difference.
At the time, many people around me felt that the Chinese dessert soup category was already outdated. Some friends asked me why anyone would still invest in Chinese dessert soups. I told them, this is not the old Chinese dessert soup.
36Kr: How would you describe Mak Kee’s store style?
XY: Internally, we position it as a modern Chinese garden style. Some people think we are Hong Kong-style, but Hong Kong-style brands have their own obvious style, such as old Hong Kong celebrity posters and a fixed display atmosphere. Mak Kee’s name is partly intended to inherit and pay tribute to Cantonese and Hong Kong-style dessert soup culture.
36Kr: Several Chinese dessert soup brands come from South China. Why was Mak Kee able to grow out of the Yangtze River Delta?
XY: F&B businesses do not just deliver products. More importantly, they deliver environment, atmosphere, and emotional value. Today’s consumers do not enter a store merely for a bowl of dessert soup. More often, they have scene-based and emotional needs.
36Kr: How do you understand this emotional value?
XY: Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen had a view that I strongly agree with: people do not need the product itself, but the scenario problem that the product solves, as well as the emotion and life meaning it evokes in that scenario.
We believe that categories such as Chinese dessert soups and tea beverages are not necessities. Instead, they have a strong proposition in providing emotional value. Many people need somewhere to rest when they get tired while shopping in a mall. Friends shopping together also need a comfortable store environment where they can chat and take photos. Mak Kee has captured this kind of demand.
So whether a product fits social sharing is a key consideration for us. Mak Kee deliberately designed an immersive action of pouring milk, letting consumers participate in the process. It deepens their memory and makes them more willing to share socially. Our consumers really like taking photos and sharing them at Mak Kee.
36Kr: What is Mak Kee’s overall consumer profile?
XY: The main customer group is young women, but the overall audience is actually very broad.
On weekends, Mak Kee’s stores often have mothers bringing children in. Occasionally, grandparents also come in. This is very different from ordinary tea beverage brands. It is rare to see elders bringing children to consume at milk tea stores.
36Kr: Are these users choosing Mak Kee because of the category itself, or because of what the brand has created?
XY: Both matter. First, from a visual style perspective, the modern Chinese garden atmosphere is more acceptable to older customers and naturally feels familiar.
Second, in terms of product, our sweetness levels and ingredient pairings lean healthier. We also introduced natural ingredients such as peach gum, lotus seeds, tapioca, and snow fungus into milk-based series. These are all traditional wellness ingredients and form a product structure that some traditional Chinese dessert soup brands do not have.
36Kr: There are now many brands doing modern Chinese-style dessert soups, including some large businesses incubating Chinese dessert soup brands. How does Mak Kee maintain its standing?
XY: Many brands imitate us. Some even copy us directly, from products to displays, but their businesses still do not perform as well as ours. That is the most intuitive result. They can only see our surface details. Mak Kee has done many things right at the same time, not just one thing. Simply copying the exterior or imitating one point is useless.
36Kr: You are crossing categories too. Why can you do it when large brands cannot?
XY: We operate through investment and post-investment management. They operate by building new ventures from scratch. Many people think that after succeeding in one category, they can succeed in any category. That is wrong. It shows a lack of respect for the market.
When we first contacted Mak Kee, friends around me said that with our experience and resources, we could simply copy it. But if copying could build a brand, F&B entrepreneurship would be too easy. Brands have underlying genes. Our choice is to invest in high-quality early-stage brands, then use our post-investment operating capabilities to empower and amplify them, rather than blindly creating something ourselves.
36Kr: After exceeding 1,000 stores, what’s next for Mak Kee?
XY: Store count is no longer the primary target. We are already first in the industry and do not need to keep chasing scale. Next, our focus is refined operations and better empowering franchisees to make money. This year, we will also continue optimizing the department structure and bringing in talent.
There are also new overseas plans. This year, Mak Kee is establishing an overseas business unit and laying out operations in multiple countries. Eight stores in the US are already under renovation. Its first store in Sydney, Australia, is being renovated, and its first store in Canada has also been confirmed.
36Kr: Mak Kee went from 53 stores to 1,000 stores in one year, and now plans to expand overseas. Is that not too fast?
XY: Every step we take is planned, not driven by impulse. Overseas expansion is not simply about doing overseas business. It is about establishing Mak Kee as an international brand. Even if we open only a few stores overseas, our brand and identity changes.
Mak Kee’s first overseas store is in Los Angeles. It took half a year to prepare. From a pure profitability perspective, the cost and return are not proportional. But from the perspective of brand positioning and top-level strategy, it is very worthwhile.
36Kr: Were there internal disagreements over the pace of expansion?
XY: At the time, the founding team wanted to first deepen its presence in the Yangtze River Delta, slow national expansion, and take a conservative route. I understood that thinking, but I directly rejected it. Mak Kee should not be just a regional brand.
36Kr: You have repeatedly expressed recognition of GoodMe on many occasions. GoodMe has been very restrained in expansion. Why did Mak Kee not follow GoodMe’s regional approach?
XY: GoodMe makes fresh fruit tea, so it must rely on a heavy supply chain and must be restrained. But Mak Kee is in the Chinese dessert soup category. It does not require such a heavy cold supply chain. The business formats are fundamentally different.
36Kr: Why do you predict a major shakeout this year?
XY: In March 2025, I said at a shareholders’ meeting that 2025 would mark both the start of intense competition and a decisive phase for Mak Kee. Many people thought competition in the category might last ten years, but I believed one year would be enough to decide the winner.
The industry has become too transparent. Once a playbook works, peers can copy it within three months. In 2026, Chinese dessert soups will enter a shakeout phase, and there will not be many opportunities left for new brands. 2025 is Mak Kee’s only window. We have to secure the number one position quickly. As I said, we cannot take a regional approach. Time does not allow it.
36Kr: Does Mak Kee have financing plans?
XY: Yes. We have never raised financing before. The company’s profitability and cash flow are both very good. Last year, dozens of institutions approached me, but I politely declined them because we did not know what we would use the money for. This year, however, we plan to bring in one or two investors. It is not for the money, but from the perspective of strategic resources and high-end talent introduction.
36Kr: Where does that stand now?
XY: We have already confirmed two interested institutions. What we value are the strategic resources, industry endorsement, and team support they can provide. Those are much more important than valuation and capital.
KrASIA features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This article was written by Zhong Yixuan for 36Kr.
Note: RMB figures are converted to USD at rates of RMB 6.78 = USD 1 based on estimates as of June 3, 2026, unless otherwise stated. USD conversions are presented for ease of reference and may not fully match prevailing exchange rates.