Chinese skincare brand Forest Cabin is well known for once being pushed to the brink of collapse.
It was during the early days of the pandemic, over the 2020 Lunar New Year. Forest Cabin had shut stores on a large scale, sales had plunged 90%, and the cash in the company’s account could last, at most, 67 days.
At that moment, Sun Laichun, founder and CEO, realized that the offline commerce business he had been proud of for more than a decade had become his most fragile burden.
Many people know what happened next. Sun entered the live streaming studio. A middle-aged man who had once feared the camera so much that he would get nervous enough to vomit became an influencer who could chat with strangers on the other side of the screen about skincare and his brand.
Forest Cabin’s fate changed along with him. At the end of last year, the company completed its listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Such a turn would have been unimaginable before. The brand was once pushed around by shopping malls when trying to secure retail space and repeatedly ran into walls when seeking financing. Now, all of that is history.
In March, Forest Cabin released its first financial report since going public.
In 2025, Forest Cabin recorded revenue of RMB 2.45 billion (USD 359.8 million), up 103% year-on-year. Net profit reached RMB 360 million (USD 52.9 million), up 93% year-on-year. Its gross margin remained at 82%, while cumulative sales of its flagship product, camellia facial oil, surpassed 55 million bottles.
Online revenue surpassed offline revenue for the first time, rising to 70.4% of total revenue. Its founder-led persona and brand persona portfolio have become distinctive markers that set it apart from traditional beauty brands.
Questions have followed, too. Critics have raised concerns over its narrow product line and the sustainability of high-end domestic Chinese brands. Sun responded as follows:
“On the road to building a high-end brand, ridicule, skepticism, and misunderstanding have never stopped. We can only accept them calmly.”
In his plan, scaling camellia facial oil is only Forest Cabin’s first step. What he wants is to follow L’Oreal’s example by building multiple brands and going international.
That does not mean Forest Cabin wants to become China’s own L’Oreal, a path that Chinese beauty brands have sought to tread before.
“We only want to be Forest Cabin,” Sun said.
The following transcript has been edited and consolidated for brevity and clarity.
36Kr: Forest Cabin started out with affordable handmade soap before moving into premium skincare. What transformation did it go through? Few Chinese beauty brands have been able to build a high-end position. Why Forest Cabin?
Sun Laichun (SL): Forest Cabin did start from a low point, but that does not mean we cannot make high-end skincare products. No one has the right to define a brand by saying, “Because you started there, you should stay there.”
Back then, although we were making handmade soap, we chose a differentiated path, opening offline stores in department stores and shopping malls. That decision truly shaped Forest Cabin’s subsequent decisions.
Another point is that we mainly owned and operated our own stores. Later, we also built out R&D and a full industrial chain. These were all heavy-asset investments, and over time, they gave us the possibility of building a high-end brand.
Since 2012, we have spent 14 years preparing, operating, and breaking through. We survived a near-death struggle to get here, and even now, there is still a gap before we become truly high-end.
36Kr: Where does that gap show?
SL: For example, we have not yet successfully created high-end serums and face creams. Beyond that, brand influence and consumer perception both take time. From another perspective, that is exactly where our future growth potential lies.
36Kr: When Forest Cabin had just started and had little visibility, how did you persuade shopping malls to bring you in? Was that process difficult?
SL: It was not just difficult. It was extremely difficult. In March 2008, Forest Cabin’s products were fully ready, and some had already been produced and placed in storage. From March to December, for nine months, I visited more than 200 shopping malls, department stores, and retail centers. About 90% rejected us outright.
Looking back, I am especially grateful to Longemont, also known as the Cloud Nine shopping mall in Shanghai’s Zhongshan Park area. The mall had just opened at the time and was relatively willing to accept a new domestic brand like ours.
More than a decade later, I happened to meet CapitaLand’s general manager at the time and thanked him in person. He said the mall would set aside slots every year to support three to five innovative local brands with potential. It had brought in many brands over the years, but Forest Cabin was one of the few that started with one store, expanded nationwide, and may still have the chance to go global.
By the time we entered a well-known department store, we already had 40–50 stores. At first, the mall gave us a good location. After we had been operating for half a year, it brought in a major Japanese brand and moved us to an area with low traffic, saying that “domestic brands do not deserve to be in the same zone as international brands.” Another six months later, it brought in South Korean brands and pushed us again, this time to the basement.
We worked for a full year, renovated twice, and did not make a cent. Six months later, the mall said the basement was being renovated and it no longer wanted cosmetics there, so we were kicked out.
Later, however, a new CEO came in. He identified more with Chinese culture and believed Chinese brands were rising, so he invited us back. I told him at the time that he did not need to have any concerns. If he asked us to move locations, we would move. If he asked us to leave, we would leave. We could accept it.
Over the years, Forest Cabin has been squeezed out and relocated countless times. We endured it bit by bit, and now we are approaching 600 stores. That is why I say it takes a process. Only by enduring loneliness and accepting constant hardship can there be a future.
36Kr: Public awareness of oil-based skincare is not high. How did Forest Cabin overcome that challenge?
SL: To be honest, Forest Cabin’s work in oil-based skin nourishment and creating the new category of facial oil was even harder than transforming the brand into a high-end player or building our offline store network.
First, there was a blank space in user awareness. Consumers were used to lotions, emulsions, and ordinary serums. They had no awareness of using oil for skincare at all. In the public’s established impression, oil meant greasiness. People were actually buying oil-control products, so there was a natural negative perception.
Second, awareness of camellia as an ingredient was weak. People only knew that camellias were beautiful, but they did not understand the plant’s skincare benefits. We had to spend a lot of energy educating the market.
The only advantage was that camellia oil skincare is backed by ancient texts, court use, and historical records going back hundreds or even thousands of years. It has been used since ancient times to moisturize the skin and fight wrinkles. Apart from that, everything depended on us investing in research, making the product lightweight and easy to absorb, and then continuing to market it.
36Kr: Can camellia plus oil-based skin nourishment support Forest Cabin’s long-term scale? There have also been persistent outside questions about whether the brand relies too heavily on a single product.
SL: This is like Coca-Cola in its early years, when it created a new category. Its critics thought its product line was too narrow because it had only one cola and did not have mineral water, alcoholic beverages, snacks, or other diversified categories. Today, Coca-Cola has long since expanded into many product lines, including Sprite and natural water.
Take SK-II today. Would you say it only sells facial treatment essences? Does Estée Lauder sell only serum? We are first focusing on becoming the leader in one category. Later, we will gradually extend from there and build multiple flagships in high-end skincare.
It is not wrong for outsiders to say Forest Cabin is currently supported by a single product. But that is only a temporary phase. Our second growth curve has already emerged, and our new brand layout is also on the way.
36Kr: What is Forest Cabin’s new brand layout?
SL: We divide the layout into three stages. The first stage is turning a single brand into a high-end brand. This is currently underway and has begun to show results. The second stage is building a multibrand portfolio. For different groups of people, different regions, and different skin types, we will form a differentiated set of brands. The third stage is globalization.
36Kr: What kind of multibrand strategy will Forest Cabin choose, or which categories will it build multiple brands around?
SL: Forest Cabin is currently positioned in the mid- to high-end segment, but there are still many gaps in the layout that need to be filled. We lack an ultra-luxury line, and we do not yet have fragrance, color cosmetics, men’s skincare, or mass market brands. Using L’Oreal as a reference, if Forest Cabin is compared with Lancôme, then we are still missing the equivalents of Helena Rubinstein, L’Oreal Paris, and Maybelline.
Even within the same segment, we focus on oil-based skin nourishment serums. We still lack brands with more specific positioning around face creams, toners, functional serums, and other categories.
36Kr: Does Forest Cabin want to become China’s L’Oreal?
SL: We do not want to become China’s L’Oreal. We are learning from L’Oreal’s multibrand layout. We only want to be Forest Cabin.
36Kr: But for many years, many companies have wanted to become L’Oreal, and none has emerged so far.
SL: I believe that among Chinese companies, an international group like L’Oreal or Estée Lauder will definitely emerge. Which company it will be is uncertain. Everyone is working hard, and that hard work is bearing fruit.
36Kr: You must have heard a lot of noise, including claims that when Chinese brands move upmarket, they are just exploiting consumers. How do you address this kind of entrenched public bias?
SL: When I was young, I lived in a coal mining area. The atmosphere there was not good. Many children would spit on the ground, smash windows, throw stones, and cause trouble. When everyone was doing bad things together, if you insisted on not following along or taking part, not only would you fail to be accepted, you would be mocked, pushed aside, and even bullied by your peers. It is like a crab bucket, when one crab tries to climb out, the others drag it back down.
Building a brand is the same. We cannot conclude that Chinese brands are not suited to going high-end just because there are few local high-end brands at the moment. That is flawed inductive thinking. We should use long-term deductive thinking to look at the trend. Twenty years ago, I was already convinced that China would be able to produce high-end skincare brands on par with international giants, and I started Forest Cabin with that dream.
36Kr: So these voices will not become an obstacle for you.
SL: My grandmother was an old lady from Shandong. One thing she often said was, “If you listen only to the mole crickets, you’ll never plant the field.” The general meaning is that you should not lose motivation because of outside noise.
36Kr: In the 2024 premium skincare ranking, Forest Cabin was the only Chinese brand among the top 15. Past results have already proved that we now have the strength to go head to head with international competitors. Going forward, how will you continue competing with them?
SL: Over the past three years, Chinese beauty brands’ overall market share has risen from less than 50% to 57% this year, and that share is still expanding. One reason is that their technological capabilities have improved. The second is that consumers’ cultural confidence has risen. So how do we compete? We still need to work steadily on research, build the brand honestly, do retail well, provide good service, and iterate step by step.
36Kr: Among high-end beauty brands in China today, only about two have truly reached the listing stage, Mao Geping and Forest Cabin. Why these two in particular?
SL: The paths we have taken are completely different, but we share some common traits. For example, we are willing to open offline stores, do retail and customer experience in a down-to-earth way, dare to create new categories, and dare to invest in mid- to high-end brands.
36Kr: Why did you get personally involved in live commerce?
SL: When facing enormous difficulty, as the person leading the team, do you ask others to charge forward on your behalf, or do so alongside them? I chose the latter. At that time, everyone was isolated at home, and no one was willing to volunteer to do live streaming.
I not only went on live streams myself, I also called on all of the company’s managers to try it and explore this new thing. Only after trying it personally can you get a feel for it, understand whether it is actually difficult, and know whether, metaphorically, the tea is bitter or the medicine is bitter.
I think any boss who has no feel for the business at all will definitely fail if they just issue blind orders. At a critical moment in a company’s transformation, leaders and managers must charge at the front. When the business has already taken shape, leaders and managers should step back from the front line to build the organization and the team, and cultivate and replicate more outstanding leaders, rather than staying on the front line forever.
36Kr: Are there entrepreneurs or companies you admire?
SL: At this stage, Huawei has been the most helpful to us. It is very strong from strategy to execution. Also, I have recently become fascinated by Danaher’s system. As Forest Cabin next lays out its multibrand, internationalization, and merger and acquisition strategies, we plan to absorb Danaher’s system as well.
36Kr: Forest Cabin has a very high gross margin. Is that also the key factor supporting your ability to continue doing well on Douyin? After all, costs on Douyin are relatively high.
SL: Our products have an average repeat purchase rate of 34.2%. But some skincare brands have repeat purchase rates of only 4–5%. Even if they work desperately every day to acquire new users, customers come once and never return, so they cannot make money at all.
So it is not high gross margin, but a high repeat purchase rate, that determines whether Forest Cabin can generate profit on Douyin. Another factor is the brand strength accumulated through more than 20 years of offline stores, which brings high conversion.
36Kr: At the moment of survival or collapse, you made two important decisions, one was to enter e-commerce, and the other was to open up to financing. Was the process of finding investors difficult?
SL: Before 2020, Forest Cabin always insisted on “guarding against fire, theft, and investors.” We had no intention of raising capital at all. At the time, the company was operating very well. Many investors came to us and repeatedly urged us to accept investment, but I rejected them all.
Then, in 2020, the pandemic suddenly arrived, and we suddenly realized that our cash flow could last only 67 days. I felt a tremendous sense of crisis.
So I began looking for investors in large numbers. During the week I was in isolation in Shanghai, from the first to the seventh day of the Lunar New Year, I contacted 50–60 investors I could reach. Some said they would come over and take a look after the pandemic passed, but I thought that by the time the pandemic passed, the company might already be gone.
I thought of what Jack Ma once said, that you have to fix the roof when the sun is shining. I regretted it deeply. When the sun was shining, I had not fixed the roof. Now it was raining, and the roof was leaking. So at that time, I resolved to generate sales ourselves, transform into e-commerce, transform into short video and live commerce, and first save the company.
After the company survived through transformation, we began proactively looking for investors again. But most of them said, “We are all investing in influencer-driven e-commerce brands now. Your brand is not attractive enough. How do we value you when you operate these stores?” In 2020, we had already reached RMB 500 million (USD 73.4 million) in sales. One investor said that because we had not built an internet business, he could only value us at RMB 100 million (USD 14.7 million). There were countless stories like that.
36Kr: For Forest Cabin now, you have already passed through the most difficult period. There should not be anything that puts you under as much pressure as you faced in 2020, right?
SL: I think every stage has different pressures. In the past, there was pressure to survive. Now, there is pressure to develop. Going public is only the first step in a long march. In the future, we still have to climb one mountain after another, build a multibrand portfolio, and pursue globalization. The road has only just begun.
KrASIA features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This article was written by Li Xiaoxia for 36Kr.
Note: RMB figures are converted to USD at rates of RMB 6.81 = USD 1 based on estimates as of May 12, 2026, unless otherwise stated. USD conversions are presented for ease of reference and may not fully match prevailing exchange rates.